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Arbitration in Income Tax Treaties: "To Be or Not to Be"
Sharon A. Reece*
Every nation has an inherent right to levy taxes according to its
own laws., Consequently, unrelieved double taxation may arise as a
result of international economic transactions which collide with national
interests. 2 Double taxation is threatened when, inter alia, the domestic
laws of various states interact and multiple jurisdictions claim the
property or the residence status of a taxpayer. 3 Conflicting interpretations of treaty provisions and adjustments in transfer pricing4 between related enterprises operating in multiple states may also create
the double taxation of related companies. These conflicts were viewed
as hazardous to international trade, and threatened to interrupt the
fabric of international commerce. 5
International law does not define the jurisdictional prerogatives to
tax. 6 Consequently, unilateral attempts to avoid double taxation were
made by some states in the form of a tax credit where the state of
residence allowed a credit for the tax levied in the host state. 7 Subsequently, a more bilateral approach was introduced in the form of
bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation which contained certain rudimentary tax provisions generally relating to inter-
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1. J. van Hoorn, Jr., Problems, Possibilities and Limitations with Respect to Measures
Against InternationalTax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 763, 764 (1978).
2. Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation,4 INTL TAX & Bus. L. 4
(1986).
3. H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An
Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 361 (1981).
4. Transfer pricing refers to the adjustment in transactions between commonly controlled
entities on the basis of an arms length standard as if the enterprises were independent.
5. See Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 3, at 361.
6. See Vogel, supra note 2.
7. The Foreign Tax Credit is covered in I.R.C. §§ 901-908. The foreign tax credit was first
introduced in the Revenue Act of 1918 and it allowed a credit against the United States Tax
of the tax paid to a foreign country. See Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 3; see also
McDonnell, Foreign Exchange and the Indirect Foreign Tax Credit, 10 J. COMP. TAX'N 301,
303 (1984).
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national shipping activities.8 These agreements preceded the existence
of tax treaties. 9
The emergence of the more sophisticated bilateral income tax
treaties to avoid double taxation signaled an era of international reciprocity and cooperation in the division of revenues between nations.10
The objective was that these treaties would encourage economic activities within the borders of each contracting state, while at the same
time preserving each state's ability to collect taxes from these activities.1 The post-World War I period saw a proliferation of bilateral
tax treaties in response to the increasing tax rates designed to alleviate
the burden of the war.12 These treaty initiatives attempted to avoid
double taxation and thereby promote international tax harmony by
delineating the tax jurisdictions of treaty partners, thereby enhancing
predictability in international tax relationships.13
The Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and
its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced the first model income tax treaty in 1963,
after years of extensive bureaucratic analysis. This was revised in
1977 and more recently in 1992.14 The OECD model addressed primarily treaty negotiations between developed countries. 15 Additionally, a
group of experts appointed by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council developed a model treaty in 1980 to serve the interests of
developing countries. 16 The U.S. Treasury Department published its

8. See Stanley S. Surrey, Factors Affecting U.S. Treasury in Conducting International
Tax Treaties, 28 J. TAX'N 277 (1968); see generally Van Raad, A Survey of the U.S. FCN
Treaties, 15 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 135 (1986); Carl Estes, Tax Treaties, 14 INT'L LAW. 508 (1980).
9. RICHARD M. HAMMER, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FIFTH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
ON TAX AND BUSINESS PLANNING,

1977 TAX TREATIES AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY

(Virginia di Francesco & Nicolas Liakas eds., 1978).
10. H. David Rosenbloom, Current Developments in Regard to Tax Treaties, 40
FED. TAX'N

165

INST. ON

§§ 31.01, .03, at 31-24 (1982).

11. Id.
12. See generally Surrey, supra note 8.
13. Stanley E. Novack, Tax Treaty Division: Cooperation In Resolving Competent Authority
Issues, 301 PLI/Tax 879, PLI Order No. J4-3639 (1990).
14. See Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital 19-192 (1977 & 1992)
[hereinafter OECD Model Treaty].
15. Robert J. Patrick, Jr., A Comparison of the United States and OECD Model Income
Tax Convention, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 613 (1978).
16. See Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/94 at 161-164 (1979).
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own model treaty in 1977 which was used as the point of departure
for U.S. treaty negotiations and a revised model was published in
1981.17

The typical tax treaty will contain, inter alia, substantive provisions
dealing with residency and domicile, 8 source and type of income, 19
dividends,2- interest, 21 royalties2 and the definition of the permanent
establishment- of a foreign enterprise, and allocation of income among
related parties.? They also provide for exchange of tax information
to assist in international enforcement.? In addition, all the model
treaties, and most of the treaties with the U.S. (except the treaty
with Ireland and with Bermuda), contain a dispute resolution clause
referred to as "The Mutual Agreement Procedure."26
The problem resolution clause of the mutual agreement procedure
becomes operative whenever double taxation is threatened or real, or
whenever disputes arise from interpretations of various provision of
the treaty. It is anticipated that as international tax authorities
scrutinize international transactions and as domestic legislations undergo revision, new areas of discord between treaty partners will be

sparked.27
This mechanism to resolve potential tax treaty disputes is essentially controlled by the respective countries' "competent authorities,"
who are designated tax officials from each signatory country, and who
have the power to confer with each other, either on their own initiative,

17. U.S. Treasury Proposed Model Convention Between the United States for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion (1981), reprinted in 3 R. RHOADES
& M. LANGEN, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS § 15.04(25) (1987)
[hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty]. For a detailed comparison of the U.S., OECD, and U.N. model
treaties, see generally Committee on United States Activities of Foreign Taxpayers, New York
State Bar Association Tax Section, Report Proposed United States Model Income Tax Treaty,
23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219 (1983).
18. OECD Model Treaty, supra note 14, art. 4.
19. Id. art. 2.
20. Id. art. 10.
21. Id. art. 11.
22. Id. art. 12.
23. Id. art. 5.
24. Id. art. 9.
25. Id. art. 26.
26. Id. art. 25; see also apps. I, II, and III for model mutual agreement procedure clauses
in the OECD model, the U.N. model, and the U.S. models respectively.
27. Paul M. Badner, InternationalTaxation: Competent Authorities Share Their Concerns,
32 TAX NOTES 573, 574 (1986); Jeanne N. Covington, Dispute Resolution Under Tax Treaties:
Current and Proposed Methods, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 367 (1989).
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or at the behest of a taxpayer to attempt a resolution of a treaty
issue. 28 The competent authorities are instructed by treaty language
to "endeavor" to resolve each case by mutual agreement; no binding
resolution or conclusion of the matter is mandated.This article does not represent a comprehensive survey of bilateral
income tax treaties. It serves the more limited purpose of examining
the objectives of the dispute resolution mechanism in these treaties
and suggests that international tax arbitration should be explored as
a replacement for the current mutual agreement procedure in these
treaties.
Taxpayers who have been subjected to tax liabilities in a way they
believe departs from the treaty agreement itself, or taxpayers who
seek to resolve interpretive issues of a treaty, may initiate relief
through the mutual agreement procedure.3 0 Treaty interpretations in
a mutual agreement will be ordinarily sustained if the interpretive
agreement is not inconsistent with the treaty.3' The competent authorities themselves may address issues relating to the elimination of
double taxation in cases not provided for in the convention,3 2 and they
can communicate directly or through their representatives. 3 The validity of this authority in its attempt to eliminate double taxation in
cases not provided for in the tax treaty has been questioned and
debated among the scholars concerning its apparent grant of legislative
authority to the competent authorities. 4
The mutual agreement procedure clause in model treaties are similar to the OECD model;35 however, the U.S. model, in addition, states
specific issues with which the competent authorities may agree.3 6 The

28. For model versions of the mutual agreement procedure in appendices, see supranote 26.
29. OECD Model Treaty, supra note 14, art. 25(3). The idea of a competent authority was
first seen in the United States Tax Treaty with Switzerland in 1939. Convention and Protocol
with Sweden Respecting Double Taxation, Mar. 23, 1939.
30. U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 25(3).
31. John F. Avery Jones et al., The Legal Nature of the Mutual Agreement Procedure
Under the OECD Model Convention - I, 6 BRIT. TAX REV. 333, 346 (1979).
32. OECD Model Treaty, supra note 14, art. 25(3).
33. Id. art. 25(4).
34. John F. Avery Jones et al., The Legal Nature of the Mutual Agreement Procedure
Under the OECD Model Convention - 11, 1 BRIT. TAx REV. 13, 17 (1980).
35. See app. I, supra note 26.
36. See app. III, supra note 26, art. 25(3).
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U.N. model also conforms to the OECD model but further provides
that
[t]he competent authorities, through consultations, shall develop appropriate bilateral procedures, conditions, methods
and techniques for the implementation of the mutual agreement procedure provided for in this article. In addition, a
competent authority may devise appropriate unilateral procedures, conditions, methods and techniques to facilitate the
above-mentioned bilateral actions and the implementation of
the mutual agreement procedure3s
Under the treaties in force with the United States, the Assistant
Commissioner (International) functions as the U.S. competent authority, with the assistance of the tax treaty division.3 An issue involving
legal interpretations of treaties requires the concurrence of the Associate Chief Counsel.3 9 In other countries the competent authority
frequently is not part of the taxing authority (many even lack expertise
in tax matters) and may not have direct control over the tax administrators. 40 This can impact the entire process since there is the possibility that the competent authority in such a jurisdiction may be reluc41
tant to reach a result it cannot enforce.
In the United States a special group of personnel are assigned to
engage in mutual agreement negotiations and certain other treaty
functions.42 This group is not involved in the day-to-day activities of
audit and collection.- In other nations, however, mutual agreement
functions are performed within the same existing administrative structures that handle the assessment and collection of taxes." It is not
unusual, therefore, to find that the same individual who initially made
an allocation is also the person to negotiate with the competent author-

37.
38.
39.
40.

See app. II, supra note 26, art. 25(4).
Rev. Proc. 91-23, 1991-1 C.B. 534.
Id.; Deleg. Order No. 114 (Rev. 9), 1990-33 I.R.B. 13.
Sanford H. Goldberg, U.S.A.: Competent Authority, 40

BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL

DOCUMENTATION 431 (1986).
41. Id.

42. George Goodrich, Canada-U.S. Tax Accounting: Competent Authority, § 482 Transfers
and Joint Audits, 4 CAN.- U.S. L.J. 151, 158 (1981).
43.

Id.

44.

Id.
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ity of the treaty country. 45 Thus, taxpayers may be unwilling to submit
detailed records to the tax administrators of two jurisdictions in order
to solve a legitimate issue.46 Each country can adopt precise procedure
to access the mutual agreement procedure. However, in a survey
conducted by the author it was shown that many countries which have
treaties with the U.S. have issued no procedural guidelines with respect to invoking this procedure and a letter is sufficient to activate
47
the process.
The United States and Canada however, have imposed very detailed guidelines on taxpayers seeking to access assistance from competent authorities under the mutual agreement procedure in treaties
with the United States. The Internal Revenue Service recently updated its method of handling mutual agreement procedure matters,
and Rev. Proc. 91-23,48 is now the only Revenue Procedure which
governs the entire competent authority process.
The United States Competent Authority will only consider requests
from United States residents or citizens once administrative review
with appeals have been pursued. 4 9 A request will be denied if the
competent authority determines that the taxpayer is not entitled to
5 or if
any benefits or safeguards under the treatyw
the taxpayer is
only willing to accept an agreement that may be prejudicial to the
United States.51 The taxpayer is therefore forced to function in the
unnatural role of considering the interests of its government in trying
to achieve a resolution of an adversarial tax issue. Other disqualifying
actions include the taxpayers insistence on participating in the negotiations,52 the failure to furnish sufficient information,o the failure to

45. Id.
46. G.K. Kwatra, Arbitration in International Tax Matters: A New Approach, 5 J. INT'L
ARB. 151-64 (1988).
47.

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE ON TAX AND BUSINESS PLANNING, NEW YORK

The Use of Competent Authority Articles, the British view 274 (Di
Francesca ed., 1977). Countries responding to the same survey conducted by the author, who
did not have formal internal rules to access the mutual agreement procedure include Pakistan,
Australia, the Netherlands, Grenada, Austria, China, Denmark, Malta [hereinafter Survey Response].
48. Rev. Proc. 91-23 supersedes Rev. Proc. 82-29, 1982-1 C.B. 481, which dealt with allocation issues, and Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-1 C.B. 573, which dealt with non-allocation issues.
49. Rev. Proc. 91-23, supra note 38, § 3.05.
50. Id. § 11.02.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
UNIVERSITY, POLLAND,
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283

comply with the controlling revenue procedure4 and the failure to
generally cooperate with the competent authority and the Internal
Revenue Service.5 Denial of a taxpayer's request for assistance from
competent authorities is not subject to review.Upon acceptance of a case, a competent authority analyst processes
the case by gathering pertinent documents and prepares a recommendation for the competent authority. 5 7 Negotiations are typically initiated by the competent authority submitting a position memorandum
to the foreign competent authority requesting the desired relief.5 Once
the process is activated, the various representatives typically share
their news through written communications, and propose reconciliation
ideas.19 The representatives then prepare any tentative agreement for
the signature of the competent authority. The form of the negotiating
procedure depends on the countries involved, and negotiations may
be conducted either orally or in writing. 6° The taxpayer is not, however, generally bound by the agreement that has been reached between the competent authorities. If the taxpayer chooses to accept
the agreement, it is not subject to further judicial or administrative
6 1
scrutiny and the taxpayer may be asked to sign a closing agreement.
Many aspects of the competent assistance process renders it burdensome and possibly ineffective as a mechanism to resolve international tax disputes. The taxpayer has a very limited role in the process.6 2 The primary role of the taxpayer seeking relief is to submit
documentation as often as requested by the competent authorities.The taxpayer is under a continuing obligation to "supply any additional
information needed to resolve the case and keep the competent authority informed about proceedings in the treaty country or any other
pertinent developments." 64 Failure to supply the required documenta-

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 11.04; John E. McDermott, Jr., IRS Reorganizes the Competent Authority Process,
2 J. INT'L TAX'N 55 (1991).
57. See Novack, supra note 13.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Survey response determined that Pakistan, Australia, The Netherlands, Austria,
China and U.K. all conduct negotiations in writing. The Canadian and U.S. competent authorities
frequently have face-to-face negotiations.
61. Rev. Proc. 91-23, supra note 38, § 11.05.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 11.01.
64. Id.
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tion or any "additional information" are grounds for denial of assistance.6 The taxpayer must also consent to disclose to the foreign competent authority any of the items submitted.66 In fact, the United
States competent authority reserves its right under the applicable
67
treaty to disclose such information even in the absence of consent.
The competent authority process is expensive6 and can extend for
years.6 9 This may be in part attributable to the attempt to resolve
complex factual issues without the taxpayer or legal representation
and the bureaucratic delays inherent in solving a case by written
communication. The delays can also exacerbate interest accrual on
proposed adjustments during the period that the case is undergoing
the competent authority process. 70 This can be quite substantial 71
when
one considers the impact of the fluctuation of foreign currency.
The taxpayer is not represented by legal counsel at the negotiations 72 and has no right to attend or participate in the negotiation
process. 73 These rules of exclusion may create a feeling of helplessness
and distrust of the entire process. This lack of direct taxpayer participation can prove detrimental to a case especially when complex factual
issues are debated. After an extended period of time and considerable
expense to the aggrieved taxpayer, the competent authorities may be
unable to reach an agreement or the binding effect of an agreement
may be questioned. 74 The latter potential varies from country to country. In Belgium and the United Kingdom a mutual agreement is not
binding 75 whereas in Norway, a mutual agreement automatically becomes incorporated into the domestic laws.76

65. Id. § 11.03.
66. Howard M. Liebman, Confidentiality of Information in Competent Authority Proceedings, 5 INT'L TAX J. 442, 445 (1979).
67. Id.
68. Glen L. Meadre, InternationalPricing:Allocation, Guidelines and Relief from Double
Taxation, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 131 (1975).
69. See generally Joseph L. Andrus et al., Competent Authority Assistance in Tax Controversies Under the New IRS Procedures, 50 TAX NOTES 1279 (1991).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Arvid Aage Skaar, Tax Policy Forum: The Legal Nature of Mutual Agreements Under
Tax Treaties, 92 TAX NOTES INT'L 95-11 (Dec. 21, 1992).
75. J.D.B. Oliver, Some Aspects of the TerritorialScope of Double Tax Treaties, 9 BRIT.
TAX REv. 303 (1990); see also Avery Jones et al., supra note 31.
76. Id.
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Small claims are not encouraged. 77 The attitude of treaty signatories
to the competent authority process varies. For example, some countries publish decisions creating an advantage for taxpayers from these
countries; others treat the decisions as confidential material.78 Since
the disclosure of any sensitive information submitted by the taxpayer
is mandated, the prospects of such information being disseminated to
foreign governments which may have less stringent rules concerning
trade secrets and litigation certainly presents a risk that many may
not be willing to take.7 9 It must also engender a feeling of distrust
for a taxpayer to rely on tax authorities to solve a double tax issue.80
Where an agreement is unsatisfactory to the taxpayer or an agreement is not reached, the taxpayer has to then enter a third round of
legal maneuvering (after the administrative review and the competent
authority process) at a substantial cost of time and money. In the
case of Boulez v. Commissioner,s1 the competent authorities were
unable to resolve a double taxation problem. During the year in question, 1975, Petitioner Boulez, a world renowned musician, was a
French citizen, a resident of Germany and a non-resident alien in the
United States for income tax purposes. He contracted with CBS Records, a division of CBS United Kingdom Ltd. which is a subsidiary
of CBS, Inc., a United States company, to serve as a producer and/or
performer for the phonography recording of a musical and/or literary
composition. Petitioner performed these services in the United States,
and was paid the sum of $39,461.47 by CBS. He reported this amount
on his German Income Tax return and paid the appropriate tax due.
On his 1975 U.S. non-resident alien income tax return, petitioner
disclosed the amount, but excluded it from U.S. income tax. The
United States Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency in
petitioner's individual income tax, asserting that the entire amount
was taxable by the United States.
The Federal Republic of Germany argued that the payments constituted "royalties" within the meaning of Article VIII of the U.S.-Germany tax treaty and pursuant to the treaty were taxable exclusively
by the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States on the other
hand asserted that the income was payment for the performance of

77.

Lionel Blumenthal, Host Country: U.K., 12 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 24 (1991).
78. In survey response, only Austria published decisions.
79. See Andrus et al., supra note 69.
80. Nancy H. Kaufman, Dispute Resolution Under Tax Treaties, The Developing Role of
the Competent Authority, 3 Wis. INT'L L.J. 101 (1984).
81. Boulez v. Commerce, 83 T.C. 584 (1984).
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services and was therefore taxable by the United States. Boulez initiated proceedings before the competent authorities to resolve the
potential double tax interest in this conflict; however, they were unable
to agree on the correct classification of the income. Competent authorities had no obligation to settle the taxpayer's problem, but their
task was complete once an "effort" to achieve an agreement was made.
Boulez then proceeded to the Tax Court, where judgment was given
in favor of the United States. It was no doubt that petitioner Boulez
had to commence further proceedings with considerable expense in
search of a resolution.
A procedure which does not guarantee a decision should not be
the dominant mechanism to resolve international tax disputes where
an alternate procedure, arbitration, has functioned effectively to resolve disputes arising from international commercial transactions.
IN DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX ARBITRATION

Support for arbitration in international tax. matters has been escalating, and the utilization of arbitration in income tax treaties has
been recognized in the hierarchy of international tax policy objectives.
In fact, the establishment of an autonomous and independent arbitral
82
institute to address international tax matters has been proposed,
with a scenario of three arbitrators, one appointed by each state and
the chairperson agreed to by both. 3 Any award would be final and
binding.-s The commentators vary on the type of arbitration rules to
utilize. Some believe, as does the author, the current internationally
accepted arbitration rules and institutes could be adapted for use in
the context of international tax matters.- Most proposals, however,
would anchor an arbitration procedure to the competent authority

82. GUSTAV LINDENCRONA & NILS MATTSSON, ARBITRATION IN TAXATION 92 (1981);
Avery Jones et al., supra note 31; Avery Jones et al., supra note 34; Kaufman, supra note 80;
Sandford H. Goldberg, How and Does the Competent Authority Work? A Multinational
Analysis, 39 THE TAX EXECUTIVE 5, 44 (1986); Maktouf Lofti, Resolving International Tax
Disputes Through Arbitration, 4 ARB. INT'L 32-51 (1988); Oliver, supra note 75; Forum: Competent Authority Assistance for Relief from Double Taxation, 12 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 20 (1991);
Leif Mut6n, New Germany-Sweden Tax Convention Examined, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 531-35
(Sept. 14, 1992) (tax) PT23547.
83. LINDENCRONA & MATrSSON, supra note 82, at 111.
84. Id.
85. See Covington, supra note 27.
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process, 6 thus making arbitration operative only when the Mutual
7
Agreement Procedure has failed.
Under the aforementioned proposal, arbitration would be two procedures removed under a tax treaty since administrative review and
appeals must be first exhausted, prior to initiating the mutual agreement procedure. Given the delays inherent in an administrative review
with appeals, and the delays inherent in the competent authority process in particular, it is submitted that this approach would render the
arbitration option meaningless. No justification is evident for resolving
international tax matters in this manner.
An Arbitration Procedure Clause should replace the current Mutual
Agreement Procedure in bilateral income tax treaties, thereby providing a neutral forum to resolve international tax disputes, in which the
goal is to achieve a final binding solution. There is indeed a palpable
need for a procedure to resolve international tax matters in which
contracting states are compelled to be bound by decisions of impartial
experts, and in which the international investor taxpayer has greater
representation. 88
The use of arbitration in taxation has been advanced most consistently to deal with issues of transfer pricing adjustments s9 In fact,
cases involving transfer pricing form the bulk of issues referred to
the Competent Authority. 9° In the period between 1971 through 1985
the United States Competent Authority reported a total of 484 dispositions in allocation cases and 323 dispositions in nonallocation cases.9 1
It has further been estimated that intercompany pricing cases represent 65% of the total number of requests received and over 95% of
the total dollars considered.The European Community members adopted an arbitration-like
provision in their multilateral convention to address transfer pricing

86. Id. see LINDENCRONA & MATTSSON, supra note 82; Kaufman, supra note 80.
87. LINDENCRONA & MATTSSON, supra note 82, at 113; Kaufman, supra note 80;
Covington, supra note 27.
88. See generally LINDENCRONA & MArrSSON, supra note 82; Kaufman, supra note 80.
89. Rom P. Watson, New Developments in Transfer Pricing Rules, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 61 (1991).
90. Goldberg, supra note 82, at 38-39.
91. Id.
92. Venuti, Competent Authority Under Tax Treaties, Presented at World Trade Institute
Seminar (Dec. 3-4, 1990), p. 8; Robert T. Cole, New Competent Authority Procedure:Allows
for Increased Flexibility, 74 J. TAX'N 390 (1991).
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issues. This was done in the form of an advisory commission. 93 Under

this convention, if after conferring with each other the competent
authorities are unable to arrive at an acceptable agreement to eliminate
double taxation, they must establish an advisory commission to resolve
the matter. 94 Upon notification of an impending price adjustment which
is not agreed to, the taxpayer may submit the claim to the appropriate
competent authority; 5 if an agreement is not reached, the competent
authorities must establish an advisory commission 96 and adhere to the
97
decision of this commission.
The advisory commission is established on an ad hoc basis to hear
disputes under the convention and consists of a chairman, two representatives of each competent authority and independent persons drawn
from a list of independent persons of standing which is maintained by
the Secretary General of the Council of the European Communities. 9s
Competent authorities are barred from disclosing information containing trade secrets. 99 The taxpayer can have private representation before the commission.-°° A decision from the advisory commission must
be forthcoming within six months from submission. 1°1

The United States-Germany Treaty was the first treaty with the
U.S. to include an arbitration provision. 10 2 The arbitration provision
was, of course, framed in deference to the mutual agreement procedure. It provides that "if a disagreement cannot be resolved by the
competent authorities, it may, if both competent authorities agree, be

93. Convention 90/463 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, art. 7(1), 1990 O.J. (L225) 10, 13. Arbitration is not
compulsory under this convention.
94. Id.
95. Id. art. 6.
96. Id. art. 7(1).
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 9.
99. Id. art. 9(6).
100. Id. art. 10(2).

101.

Id. art. 11.

102. Tax Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 25(1), S. TREATY Doc.
No. 10, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1990), reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3249. Article 26
of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty contains an arbitration clause similar to the U.S.-Germany Treaty.
This provision is only operative after the competent authorities are deadlocked for two years.
See Turro, U.S. and Mexico Sign Long-Awaited Income Tax Treaty and Protocol, 56 TAX
NOTES 1692 (1992).
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submitted for arbitration. . . . ", Subsequently, the Treaty between
the United States and the Netherlands provide that,
if any difficulty or doubt arising as to the interpretations or
application of this Convention cannot be resolved by the
competent authorities in a mutual agreement procedure pursuant to the previous paragraphs of this Article, the case
may, if both competent authorities and the taxpayer(s) agree,
be submitted for arbitration, provided the taxpayer agrees
in writing to be bound by the decision of the arbitration
board. The decision of the arbitration board in a particular
case shall be binding on both States with respect to that
case. The provisions of this paragraph shall have effect after
the States have so agreed through the exchange of diplomatic
notes. 04
The insistence on a supplementary role for arbitration reflects a
conflict between the desire for certainty in resolving international tax
disputes and the apparent reticence of sovereign states to cede jurisdiction of claims arising from the matters which may impact on the
public fisc.' 0 5 Arbitration, however, satisfies the policy goals of efficiency, neutrality and certainty, 10 and should therefore not be relegated to a supplementary role. The efficiency gains that arbitration
would generate in terms of uniformity should be available to any
taxpayer operating in the international arena.
Arbitration has been increasing in the context of international
agreements in general. ,o7This boost in arbitration is partly attributable
to the fact that arbitration allows the parties to agree on the rules of
the game. °8 Arbitrators can be chosen with particular expertise in

103. Convention between the U.S. and the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation (1992) art. 29(5), reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6103.05 (1992); "U.S.-Dutch Treaty
Reflects Changes Policies and Economic Forces," 4 JOIT 104 (Nov. 1993).
104. Convention between the U.S. and the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation (1992) art. 29(5), reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6103.05 (1992).
105. Meadre, supra note 68; see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION &
DEVELOPMENT, COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THREE TAXATION ISSUES 11,

106.

Meadre, supra note 68;

34 (1984) [hereinafter

THREE TAXATION ISSUES].

THREE TAXATION ISSUES, supra note

104.

107.

Hans Bagner, Enforcement of International Commercial Contracts by Arbitration:
Recent Developments, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 573 (1982).
108. Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry & Patrick Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Disputes
Provision in InternationalBusiness Contracts: Recent Developments in Arbitration and Other
Processes, 45 Bus. LAW. 577, 591 (1990).
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the area' °9 and arbitration adds finality to the issue." 0 The neutrality,
speed and the fact that the taxpayer can participate fully and have
access to legal counsel are also responsible for its growing popularity.",
In short, "arbitration has been able to keep its place among international institutions of dispute resolution.112
Arbitration has been deemed appropriate to resolve issues which
relate to domestic and public policy matters."3 The United States case
law"1 reflects an endorsement of the use of arbitration to resolve
International Commercial disputes even where the claims related to
fundamental public policy issues such as those raised by antitrust
laws. "5 Arbitration agreements and awards are also enforceable under
the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention,11 6 which has been ratified
by most western industrialized countries and many developing coun-

tries. 117
Proponents of the competent authority process urge that remedial
measures are afoot to improve and streamline the current process.""
Modification goals include the resolution of cases in two years," 9 more
face to face meetings between the competent authorities- 2° and a more
active role for the taxpayer in developing the cases.' 2 ' Notably absent
from the suggested improvements is the goal of having a more definite
goal of resolution of a disputed treaty issue. The resolution of a taxpayer's legitimate concerns should not depend on continued goodwill
among the competent authorities, political persuasion or the maintenance of political status quo. Taxpayers deserve a more sanguine perspective of protections under bilateral income tax treaties.

109. Douglas D. Reichert, ProvisionalRemedies in the Context of InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 3 INT'L TAx & Bus. L. 368, 369 (1986).

110.

Id.

111. See Bagner, supra note 107.
112. Louis B. Sohn, The Role of Arbitration in Recent InternationalMultilateralTreaties,
23 VA. J. INT'L L. 171 (1983).
113. Id.
114. See Brennen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1097 (1972); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S. Ct. 2449 (1974).
115. Soja Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).
116. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards gives signatories to the Convention the power to enforce arbitral awards rendered in
signatory states. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988) codifies 1958 New York Convention.
117. See Mentschikoff, supra note 115.
118. Presentation given by Regina M. Deanehan, IRS Assistant Courier (Int'l), at the IRS
& G.W.U. 5th Annual Institute on Current Issues in Int'l Taxation, Dec. 14-15 (1992).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol7/iss2/3

14

Reece: Arbitration
in Income
Tax Treaties:
"To Be or Not to Be"
ARBITRATION
IN INCOME
TAX TREATIES

Arbitration may not be a panacea to avoid all the concerns associated with the competent authority process, but it represents a
type of formal adversarial proceeding with an opportunity for examination and cross-examination. This offers a more predictable outcome
to the parties. More importantly, arbitration must result in a definitive
decision which is binding. In contrast, the competent authority is
saddled with the impossible task of representing the interests of both
the government and the taxpayer, in search of a compromise. These
are clearly conflicting and competing interests at work here. The taxpayer must also accommodate the interests of the government or face
the risk of denial of assistance from a competent authority altogether.
Arbitration applies judicial procedures rather than political compromise. The competent authority process, on the other hand, represents a diplomatic exercise which is less suitable to resolving complex
tax treaty issues, especially in the absence of direct contribution from
the taxpayer seeking relief. 22 Arbitration is more efficient and more
flexible.1- It offers a less expensive and swifter method of settling
disputes and affords the parties a neutral mode of dispute resolution
which eliminates local prejudice.-l
An arbitration clause in income tax treaties would signal a commitment to certainty in dispute resolution. 25 The utilization of institutional
arbitration 126 in the international tax arbitration context should receive
acceptance by both the developing and developed countries since both

122. Joanne K. Lelewer, International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for Resolving
Treaty Disputes, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 379 (1989); Mary M. Lovik, Anatomy of a
Dispute Clause: Intergovernmental Arbitration Under the Spacelab Agreement, 5 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 397, 398 (1982).

123. Lelewer, supra note 122; Louik, supra note 122.
124. Lelewer, supra note 122; Louik, supra note 122; John T. Schmidt, Arbitration Under
the Auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID):
Implications of the Decision on Jurisdictionin Alcoa Minerals Inc. v. Government of Jamaica,
17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90, 103-04 (1976).
125. Kenneth R. Simmonds et al., Roundtable: Public InternationalArbitration, 22 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 149 (1987).
126. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of other States made in Washington Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force for the U.S. Oct. 14, 1966), codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650,
1650(a) (1970) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]). International Tax Arbitration could utilize the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which provides facilities of an
international nature to accommodate arbitration of investment disputes between states and
nationals of other states pursuant to the ICSID Convention.
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participated in the process that created the ICSID, 127 and the provisions of the convention reflected a sensitivity to the concerns of developing states wishing to attract foreign investors.'2
Although arbitration has been proposed for income tax treaties
and the lack of a compulsory dispute resolution has been criticized,'2
few nations have grasped the opportunity to include arbitration provision as an alternative to the competent authority process.13 0 The question remains, "is arbitration in income tax treaties to be or not to
be?" An arbitration procedure would transcend the effectiveness of
the mutual agreement procedure.
The resistance to and suspicion of arbitration traditionally harbored
by developing countries, due to the notion that international arbitration
is biased and tainted in favor of developed countries,13 ' is disappearing.
Developing countries are becoming more receptive to international
arbitration; 132 they provide a more secure environment to developing
states since "in law all states are considered equal."'3
CONCLUSION

Today, there exists a motley array of income tax treaties
worldwide. The increase in tax treaty executions and multi-national
and international transactions signals the need to reassess the efficacy
of the current dispute resolution mechanism of tax treaties. Compulsory arbitration would auger a new era in dispute resolution under

127. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States Mar. 18, 1965, reprinted in ICSID,
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention, Vol. II pt. 2, at
1069, 1073 (1968).
128. Id.; see also Michael M. Moore, InternationalArbitrationBetween States and Foreign
Investors, The World Bank Convention, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1359, 1360 n.6 (1966).
129. See Avery Jones et al., supra note 82.
130. Robert G. Clark, TransferPricing, Section 482 and InternationalTax Conflict; Getting
Harmonized Income Allocation Measures from Multinational Cacophony, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1155 (1993).
131. Kwatra, supra note 46, at 161; M. Sornorajah, The Climate of InternationalArbitration, 8 J. INT'L ARB. 47 (1991); Bruce G. Rinker, The Future of Arbitrationin Latin America,
8 CASE W. L.J. 480 (1976); H.A. Grigera-Naon, Latin American: Overcoming Traditional
Hostility Towards Arbitration 1988, at 1, PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series International Commercial Arbitration No. 375 (1988); see also Shikata, ICSID and Latin
America, 1 News from ICSID, No. 2, at 2 (1984). Latin American countries which have ratified
the ICSID Convention include, Panama, Ecuador, El Salvador and Paraguay.
132. See Grigera-Naon, supra note 131.
133. Id. For a detailed survey of recent trends in International Commercial Arbitration see
Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 108, at 577.
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the income tax treaty. The time is at hand to develop a more progressive approach to international tax disputes which are both sensitive
to the needs of the taxpayers and responds to the declared international policy favoring arbitration. Indeed parties can always reach a
settlement during the arbitral process; however, the prospect of a
binding award may motivate the parties to bargain seriously and efficiently.
APPENDIX I - OECD 1992 Model
Article 25-MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEDURE
1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective
of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those States, present
his case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which
he is a resident or, if his case comes under paragraph 1 of Article 24,
to that of the Contracting State of which he is a national. The case
must be presented within three years from the first notification of the
action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provision of
the Convention.
2. The competent authority shall endeavor, if the objection appears
to it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory
solution, to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent
authority of the other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance
of taxation which is not in accordance with the Convention. Any agreement reached shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits
in the domestic law of the Contracting States.
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. They
may also consult together for the elimination of double taxation in
cases not provided for in the Convention.
4. The competent authorities of the Contracting States may communicate with each other directly for the purpose of reaching an agreement in the sense of the preceding paragraphs. When it seems advisable in order to reach agreement to have an oral exchange of opinions,
such exchange may take place through a Commission consisting of
representatives of the competent authorities of the Contracting States.
CCH, Tax Treaties
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APPENDIX II
Article 25 of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention
Between Developed and Developing Countries provides as follows:
1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective
of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those States, present
his case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which
he is a resident or, if his case comes under paragraph 1 of article 24,
to that of the Contracting State of which he is a national. The case
must be presented within three years from the first notification of the
action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of
the Convention.
2. The competent authority shall endeavor, if the objection appears
to it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory
solution, to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent
authority of the other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance
of taxation which is not in accordance with this Convention. Any
agreement reached shall be implemented notwithstanding any time
limits in the domestic law of the Contracting States.
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor
to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as
to the interpretation or application of the Convention. They may also
consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not
provided for in the Convention.
4. The competent authorities of the Contracting States may communicate with each other directly for the purpose of reaching an agreement
in the sense of the preceding paragraphs. The competent authorities,
through consultations, shall develop appropriate bilateral procedures,
conditions, methods and techniques for the implementation of the
mutual agreement procedure provided for in this article. In addition,
a competent authority may devise appropriate unilateral procedures,
conditions, methods and techniques to facilitate the above-mentioned
bilateral actions and the implementation of the mutual agreement procedure.
U.N. Doc. No. 57/ESA/102/1980.
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APPENDIX III
Article 25 of the 1981 U.S. Model is a quite similar model and provides
as follows:
1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective
of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those States, present
his case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which
he is a resident or national.
2. The competent authority shall endeavor, if the objection appears
to it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory
solution, to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent
authority of the other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance
of taxation which is not in accordance with the Convention. Any
agreement reached shall be implemented notwithstanding any time
limits or other procedural limitations in the domestic law in the Contracting States.
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. In particular the competent authorities of the Contracting States may agree
(a) to the same attribution of income, deductions, credits, or allowances of an enterprise of a Contracting State to its permanent establishment situated in the other Contracting State;
(b) to the same allocation of income, deductions, credits, or allowances between persons;
(c) to the same characterization of particular items of income;
(d) to the same application of source rules with respect to particular
items of income;
(e) to a common meaning of a term;
(f) to increases in any specific amounts referred to in the Convention
to reflect economic or monetary developments; and
(g) to the application of the provisions of domestic law regarding
penalties, fines and interest in a manner consistent with the purposes
of the Convention.
They may also consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention.
CCH, Tax Treaties
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